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PARAGON · #97 11-10-2005, 10:07 PM

<Table>
<H2>One-Shot Drops
Surviving the Myth
By ANTHONY J.
PINIZZOTTO, Ph.D., HARRY A. KERN, M.Ed., and EDWARD F. DAVIS, M.S.</H2>

On a summer evening in the
northeastern part of the United States, a patrol officer received a radio
dispatch at approximately 7 p.m. to respond to an address for a disorderly
subject. The officer arrived at the location and parked his patrol vehicle on
the opposite side of the street, several houses away. Before exiting the
vehicle, the officer paused to observe the scene. He saw a male move from behind
a large tree in front of the address of the alleged disorderly subject. The
officer started to exit his vehicle, but then stopped when he saw the male, with a
gun in each hand, begin to run toward him. The man fired both weapons at the
officer, who returned two rounds from his service weapon, striking the male in
the center of his chest. However, the man continued to fire. One round struck
the officer in the head, killing him instantly. The male survived the two
gunshot wounds and later was convicted of killing the officer. 
This scenario is a collage of
several cases dealing with the use of deadly force, by and against law
enforcement, that the authors have examined over
the last decade. Studying these cases and interacting with officers attending
the FBI National Academy,1 who have experienced similar
incidents in their own agencies, have led them to question if officers have died
because of any of the following factors: 
<UL>
<LI>The type of weapon
issued to the officer.

<LI>The type of
ammunition the department issued for service rounds.

<LI>The lack or quality
of self-defensive training provided to the officer.
<LI>Overconfidence because the officer was wearing a bullet-resistant vest and,
thereby, took unnecessary chances.
<LI>The officer’s own preparation for a violent encounter, such as wearing a
bullet-resistant vest or remaining in excellent physical condition.
<LI>The officer’s choice to notify dispatch of the location during a traffic
stop or other encounter with suspects.
<LI>ny other circumstances presently unknown to the officer’s department.
In the opening scenario, did the officer “hesitate” after firing
the two rounds that struck the offender? Was he instructed to “double tap” and
pause, as many departments once trained?
The authors have learned from their research on law enforcement
safety that there exists a significant hesitancy on the part of many officers to
use deadly force. However, they have not determined the reason for either the
hesitation or why officers stop shooting before they neutralize the threat. One
question they can answer is that handguns used for protection by law enforcement
are capable of immediately eliminating a deadly threat quickly.
However, the fact largely remains that bullet placement, rather than caliber,
causes immediate stop-page of body functions in most instances. 2
With all of this in mind, then, if officers are adequately
armed, what causes them to fall victim to criminals wielding less powerful
weapons? An examination of the myth of the “one-shot drop,” data relative to the
type of weapons offenders have used to attack officers, and effective survival
and firearms training may help law enforcement agencies begin to reverse this
tragic trend.

</LI>[/list]

In many of the classic, albeit simplistic, cowboy movies from
the early days of the American film industry, the stereotypical “good guys” wore
white hats, whereas the “bad guys” donned black ones. After meeting in the
middle of a dirt street in some small town, two shots would ring out. The bad
guy’s bullet always missed, but the one from the hero in the white hat
inevitably found its mark and freed the town of the criminal threat. With one
shot from the good guy’s gun, the bad guy immediately dropped to the ground and
became completely incapacitated.
In today’s films and television
programs, Hollywood has varied not only the clothing of the actors but also
their standards and demeanor, both the good guys and the bad guys. It now has
become difficult to distinguish the protagonist from the antagonist.
Unfortunately, however, this increased realism has not always carried over to
the portrayal of gun battles. Many current shooting scenes continue to display
unrealistic reactions and underlying expectations regarding ballistic effects.
For example, one shot from a handgun often lifts the wounded person 2 feet off
the ground and causes immediate incapacitation. 
Even knowing that these are
movies and television programs, some in the law enforcement community still
expect one-shot drops in real-life shootings. In fact, few actual instances end
this way. 
Realistic and regular law
enforcement training must counterbalance and mentally and emotionally override
the fallacy of the one-shot drop still promoted by some media. Short of
disrupting the brain or severing the upper spinal column, immediate
incapacitation does not occur.3 Therefore, the threat remains
to the officer. Yet, implicit in the media presentations of law enforcement
encounters is the belief that with the “proper handgun” and the
“proper ammunition,” officers will inflict immediate incapacitation if they
shoot offenders anywhere in the torso. Varied and multiple real-life law
enforcement experiences contradict this false and dangerous belief. 
<H3 align=left>Actual Shootings
</H3>
In the authors’ ongoing study
of violence against law enforcement officers, they have examined several cases
where officers used large-caliber hand guns with limited effect displayed by the
offenders. In one case, the subject attacked the officer with a knife. The
officer shot the individual four times in the chest; then, his weapon
malfunctioned. The offender continued to walk toward the officer. After the
officer cleared his weapon, he fired again and struck the subject in the chest.
Only then did the
offender drop the knife. This individual was hit five times with 230-grain,
.45-caliber hollow-point ammunition and never fell to the ground. The offender
later stated, “The wounds felt like bee stings.” 
In another
case, officers fired six .40-caliber, hollow-point rounds at a subject who
pointed a gun at them. Each of the six rounds hit the individual with no visible
effect. The seventh round severed his spinal cord, and the offender fell to the
ground, dropping his weapon. This entire firefight was captured by several
officers’ in-car video cameras. 
In a final case, the subject
shot the victim officer in the chest with a handgun and fled. The officer,
wearing a bullet-resistant vest, returned gunfire. The officer’s partner
observed the incident and also fired at the offender. Subsequent investigation
determined that the individual was hit 13 times and, yet, ran several blocks to
a gang member’s house. He later said, “I was so scared by all those shots; it
sounded like the Fourth of July.” Again, according to the subject, his wounds
“only started to hurt when I woke up in the hospital.” The officers had used
9-millimeter, department-issued ammunition. The surviving officers re ported
that they felt vulnerable. 

They wondered if they
had done some thing wrong that caused their injury or placed them in the
proximity of physical danger. They also wondered if they would react differently
if faced with a similar situation. 
<H3>Practical
Expectations </H3>

Social science discloses that
if people expect to see something, they well may see it. For ex ample, in basic
psychology courses, instructors generally include the perceptual set theory,
which shows students a picture. Although exactly the same picture, it appears to
some as an old woman, whereas others see a young woman. People often see what
they expect to see. This explains why so many sightings of the Loch Ness
“monster” turn out to be floating logs. 
Officers’ expectations of how
they will respond when shot significantly affect their reactions to these
situations. Development of advanced, practical expectations may be influenced best by clarifying
misconceptions and imparting new knowledge during purpose-driven training
concerning the topic. Absent a clear, purposeful understanding of the session’s
training objectives, little influential and practical learning can occur.
Further, lack of purposeful training may prove detrimental to an officer’s
practical expectations, psychological
preparation, and capabilities when employing complex tasks in response to the
significant stressors of a life-threatening, critical incident. 
Humans are largely
differentiated from animals through their miraculous ability to develop skills
and abilities to perform multiple, complex tasks simultaneously through
repetitive practice. By necessity of minimizing risk to themselves and others,
officers effectively learn many firearm-use procedures and tactics through a
progressive building-block process. Herein, initial exposure is given to
learning gross and fine motor skills. Some conscious behaviors develop into
subconscious ones. Officers progressively hone skills to a reasonable level of
mastery, then apply them under shorter time constraints during which they must
incorporate and maintain mental processes of
assessing their surroundings and changing conditions. Trainers need to remain
cognizant of the role that repetition plays in the mental processes reinforced
during training scenarios and courses of fire. From learners’ perspectives,
ideal firearms and tactics training objectives should embrace an achievable
notion that they will learn “something new” about their personal performances,
skill levels, and capabilities with their equipment each time they receive
training. 
<H3>THE
DATA </H3>
To better grasp the scope and
gravity of the myth of the one-shot drop, the authors provide an over view of
felonious, line-of-duty law enforcement officer deaths. From 1993 to 2002, 636
officers were feloniously killed in the line of duty.4 Offenders used handguns,
ranging from .22 to .50 caliber, to kill 443 of the officers.5 Forty-five of these victims
were slain with their own weapons. 
Fifty-six of the 443 officers
(12.6 percent) were killed by small-caliber weapons that fire lightweight
bullets at low velocity and included .22, .25, and .32 calibers. Undoubtedly, no
officer would consider any of these firearms as a primary weapon of choice, and
no records indicated that agencies issued any of these to their uniformed patrol
officers. 
Concerning the 45 officers
killed with their own weapons, 3 were slain with small-caliber rounds from
backup/off-duty weapons they carried, either .22 or .25 caliber. Twenty-five
officers (56
percent) were killed with their 9-millimeter or .40 caliber service weapons,
common to law enforcement during the time period examined. The remaining 17
officers were slain with other weapons, including .38 caliber, .357 magnum, 10
millimeter, .44 magnum, and .45 caliber. 

In two previous studies on
violence against law enforcement officers conducted by the authors, offenders
stated their reason for selecting a particular firearm as availability, 41 per
cent in the first study and 68 percent in the second.6 These offenders did not care
about bullet weight or velocity. The majority of the offenders in both studies
had been involved in prior shootings before assaulting or killing the officers.
Their major concern was being “fast on the trigger” and delivering the bullet to
its intended target. One stated, “There’s no time to sight up the gun. If you
hesitate, you’re dead.” 

Because of the time
needed for adjudicating these offenses, the most recent disposition data
available for offenders involved in line-of-duty law enforcement officer
felonious deaths are for the 10 years 1991 to 2000.7 Of the 665 persons charged
with killing a law enforcement officer for this time period, only 9 remained
fugitives. The majority (464) of these individuals were arrested and convicted of
murder. The victim officers justifiably killed only 23 of their attackers. Other
officers responding to the scene killed an additional 78 offenders. Sixty-two of
the perpetrators committed suicide after killing the officer. In their ongoing
research, the authors are examining if any of these incidents could have started
as an officer-assisted suicide or, more commonly, suicide by cop. 
<H4 align=center>Law
Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed in the Line of Duty with Firearms
1993-2002 </H4>
<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="45%" align=center
summary="This table lists Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed in the Line of Duty with Firearms from 1993 through 2002 "
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</Table>